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America.

Letters by Vigil.





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A M E R I C A .

L E T T E R S

BY

VIGIL.

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A M E R I C A .

LETTER I.

FEBRUARY 14TH, 1872.

It has been truly observed by a semi-official Russian journal, that any prolonged, cordial understanding between Great Britain and America is simply impossible. Not that Englishmen harbour hostile sentiments towards their trans-Atlantic kinsmen, whom they regard with the most friendly feelings; but because American rulers are ever prone to adopt a rapacious policy, being imbued with boundless ambition, and incited by an unscrupulous press well versed in the art of insolent bullying. So far as the writer's recollection serves him, some subject of dispute between England and America has always been kept alive by the Cabinet of Washington; in readiness, perhaps, for sharper contention, whenever this country should be involved in serious difficulties. Before the close of the last century misunderstandings had arisen between us, not altogether unprovoked on our part; although the States were fain to endure far greater indignities at the hands of France. In 1812, ere the tide of fortune had turned

against Napoleon, advancing then at the head of a vast army to impose terms of submission upon Russia, and when Britain was engaged in carrying on a world-wide contest, the American Congress unexpectedly declared war against us, in the confident expectation of being able to seize upon Canada. Yet, though that province was wholly unprepared for defence, having then but a comparatively scanty population, not only were the invaders repulsed, but Canadian Volunteers and Militia actually conquered Michigan, which they held till peace was concluded.

In all our negotiations with the United States we have been completely foiled, surrendering almost every point in dispute. It was thus in the Bay Islands difference, and upon the frontier question. On this latter occasion, America rejected an award pronounced after long deliberation by the King of Holland, who had been mutually chosen as an arbitrator, and which assigned the long-coveted settlement of Madawaska to Canada. Nevertheless, when, some years later, that district had been weakly ceded by Lord Ashburton, it became known that there existed among the archives at Washington a map, traced by Franklin's own hand, ascribing that territory to the British possessions. Unluckily, all these concessions, made out of pure good will, in order to ensure amicable relations between two peoples nearly allied in blood, invariably fail to attain their object; whilst they are usually attributed by foreign Powers to our apprehension of war. Such a

calamity, however, might inflict much heavier losses on Americans, than upon ourselves. For if, as has been openly menaced, any attempt were made forcibly to occupy the island of St. Juan,—a position of great importance to our ships in the North Pacific,—or to violate the Canadian frontier, it seems by no means improbable that an inevitably consequent naval war would result in renewed revolt of the late Confederate States, whose hatred of their Northern conquerors will outlive the existing generation. That fanatical anti-slavery spirit which animated Federalists, filling their armies with recruits during the insurrectionary civil war, no longer now prevails; and even other sub-divisions might possibly take place. Nor need the admirers of this overgrown Republic deplore disruptions which would leave each section more at liberty to pursue its own divergent interests. “I see no objection,” wrote President Jefferson, on the cession of Louisiana, “to the apprehended severance of our Confederation into two or more separated Republics; since I consider the earlier, and the more recently planted states, in the light only of elder and younger brethren, who need remain no longer united than may suit their interest and their happiness.” Such a redivision of powerful States, each abundantly strong for self-defence, should be no cause of grief to European nations, who would no longer then be exposed to often urged inordinate demands, accompanied by threats of violence. “As for enemies,” writes the author of a political pamphlet published more than

thirty years ago, "Europe at least has no motive to meddle in any way with the Southern States. We are not its rivals in agriculture, trade, or manufactures; and nature has bound us together in cords of perpetual friendship. We raise the raw material, and they manufacture it. It is the people of the North whom I fear. The Tariff Bill, though in form and colour a revenue measure, was in truth an Act for rendering the South tributary to the North. As regards Great Britain and the Plantation States, thus stands the case. We can raise cotton, she cannot. She can manufacture, we cannot; and a mutually beneficial exchange of the commodity each is able to supply on the best terms might be carried on between us, supporting in good measure the industry of both. There is no rivalry, therefore, nor is there likely to be any, between Europe and the Plantation States; as there is, and ever must be, between Old England and New England. Our true interest is in a free and uninterrupted commerce with the whole world, and particularly with England, where are workshops sufficient to work up the raw material which we raise." Such were the well grounded convictions of Southerners many years before they endeavoured by force of arms to emancipate themselves from Northern domination, and to achieve their political independence; an attempt in which they unfortunately failed after a brave struggle against great odds, being heavily weighted with the incubus of slavery now happily abolished.

LETTER II.

MARCH 22ND, 1872.

I do not doubt that there are multitudes amongst our Western kinsmen who entertain very friendly feelings towards us. Unfortunately, however, these are not the persons who exercise any potential control over the Government at Washington ; which is conducted, less, perhaps in accordance with national interests, and public opinion,—hard to arrive at through the medium of a sensational press, than to meet the exigencies of party cabals, and electioneering tactics, where there is an almost perpetual struggle for political power. Therefore, it is that I draw a wide distinction between Americans and their Rulers, whose policy is often very inimical towards Britain, having been condemned even by some of their own most eminent statesmen. What can be more hostile than the tone assumed by Mr. Sumner, late Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in their Senate ; a body constitutionally exercising important administrative functions ? I am blamed for recurring to “old feuds,” and for “putting forward a long array of accusations” against the great

democratic Republic, but was there ever such an "array" of past grievances paraded as those contained in the now famous "American case?" And here, permit me to observe, that the absurd idea of making Great Britain liable for consequential damages, alleged to have been incurred by the United States through our "premature" acknowledgment of belligerent rights in the Southern Confederacy—a claim adduced in the Conference at Washington—was doubtless withdrawn because American negociators perceived that any such demand must have equally inculpated other European Powers, who simultaneously with England, made the very same admission. Even their own Cabinet implicitly recognised Southern belligerency by proclaiming a blockade of its coasts, and in asserting, therefore, the right of search. A recognition of such rights becomes indeed indispensable where two maritime people are engaged in hostilities; unless the armed cruisers of one or other party be regarded as pirates. Insurrectionary Greece was recognised as a belligerent long before she had emancipated herself from Mahomedan rule; and an American Secretary of State did not hesitate to instruct one of their diplomatic agents, that he should acknowledge the Hungarian Provisional Government, then in rebellion against the Austrian Emperor, if only he could find its flag flying over a single city.

Many experienced politicians regret that our ministers rejected urgent instances said to have been made

by Napoleon III., for jointly recognising, not alone belligerent rights, but the political independence also of Southern Confederate States, who had formed then a regularly constituted government, and were waging successful warfare. After the revolt of our American provinces in the last century, France made haste to acknowledge their independence, yet without being immediately involved in war with Britain ; and notwithstanding that the famous *Paul Jones*, with other adventurous corsairs, fitted out their privateers in French ports, inflicting great injury on English trade. Attributed remissness on our part, in suffering the *Alabama* with her consorts to escape, cannot be comparable to such patent complicity, but which never formed the ground of any claim for pecuniary reparation from France ; and yet are we coolly invited to pay an almost countless amount of indemnity, for merely imputed negligence. Should war be now forced upon us, as American papers have threatened, it would be well to recollect that there are six or eight millions of their people essentially indisposed to the Union ; and that not less than five distinct sections of their States are influenced by diverse material interests. This will hardly be controverted. Years before southern discontents broke forth into open insurrection, it was easy to discern that events tended to some attempted severance. Frequently recurring disputes in Congress between North and South could admit of no other solution. Their animosity was implacable, their recriminations

were unceasing. "Before next November," exclaimed a New England Legislator, "the South shall be made to submit." "I will yet live," retorted a Southern Senator, "to call over the head roll of my slaves under the shadow of Bunker's Hill." So long ago as in 1856, I took the liberty of observing that if, in the inevitably approaching conflict, "Northerners should prevail, then, judging from past occurrences, and from the hatred certain to be engendered by internecine strife, it seemed clear that slavery would soon be abolished at any cost to their antagonists, or even at the hazard of considerable loss to themselves; and that an onerous tariff, protective to Northern products, would be imposed on the commerce of their vanquished Confederates." These predictions have been long since verified. The seceding Republics succumbed to superior forces, being tainted with the plague spot of slavery; and they are now taxed at the selfish greed of New England manufacturers, instead of having their ports open for free trade with all the world. As regards any contemplated recognition of the Southern Confederacy, the possibility of a strong slave-holding power being ever established in the West, has been justly deprecated. There could be little doubt, however, that under any circumstances, and even had the Confederates achieved their independence, slavery must have been doomed in America. With the coterminous frontier of a free country, where there should be no fugitive slave law, it would not have been

practicable any longer to maintain their "domestic institution;" and negro emancipation in the Plantation States was therefore a question only of time, or mode. Although Southern planters might talk big about "re-opening the slave-trade," they very well knew that a recurrence to that crime had become impossible when opposed to the determination of civilized mankind. Yet, beyond question the then existence of slavery in the South did tend to prevent a recognition of its independence by European governments; for few people entertain any doubt that it would be advantageous to other nations, and even perhaps to Americans themselves, if their unwieldy Federation were re-divided into two or more distinct Republics, each section pursuing independently its own several interests. "There is a fashion," writes Cooper, in his *Notions of the Americans* "of predicting the separation of the United States, and a consequent disorganization of society; but admitting that the prediction should be realized, a division of the Confederation into two or three Republics is the utmost that can be expected. It is a matter of indifference whether our people live under one, or under a dozen Governments." Certainly the union of their present huge Confederacy, cannot be needed for purposes of self-defence, since, as an English traveller observes, Americans laugh to scorn the idea of European aggression.

The whole system of international arbitration, as now proposed, seems to be a scheme beset with

difficulties ; and even assuming that the official counsellors of any selected Sovereign should be wholly inaccessible to considerations of State policy, or absolutely unbiassed in the advice they might offer. When the *Trent* affair fell out, and four envoys from the Southern States, having been seized by an American man-of-war from on board one of Her Majesty's mail-packets, were imprisoned in Fort Warren at Boston, some well-intentioned persons in England urged that the matter should be submitted for "arbitration." Lord Palmerston, then Prime Minister, being ably supported by his colleagues, took a very different view of the question ; and Earl Russell, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, demanded an instant release of the persons detained, in order that they might again be placed under British protection ; a requisition which was energetically supported by the French Emperor. In an elaborately argumentative reply, Mr. Seward attempted to justify the conduct of Captain Wilks, commanding the United States cruiser ; but he concluded by saying that the four prisoners in question would be cheerfully liberated. In the meanwhile, however, and although it was mid-winter, troops had been dispatched to Canada, and our Mediterranean fleet was ordered to the West Indies.

A well-known eminent jurist, writing under the signature of HISTORICUS, clearly indicated the futility of arbitration, instancing what had occurred on the frontier controversy. "Such then," says this writer

“is the history of an arbitration with the United States. In 1827 an agreement is made to abide by the award of the arbitrator. It takes two years before the case is stated. Another year elapses before the award is made. The Government of the United States take a year and a half before they decide whether they will be bound by the award : and five years after the original agreement of arbitration, they throw the award overboard altogether—a course, indeed, in which they had been anticipated by their own representative acting without instruction. And then, after the lapse of ten years more, the affair is ultimately concluded by direct negotiation. If, after this, we can go into another arbitration with the United States, the lessons of history are indeed no better than an old almanack. A Government that should be hoodwinked by so illusory a proposition would be more foolish than the birds of the air, in whose sight we are told that the ‘snare of the fowler is set in vain.’” These observations are scarcely less apposite now than they were at the time of their publication ten years ago.

LETTER III.

APRIL 5TH, 1872.

A rupture of the Washington Treaty seems to have been rendered almost inevitable, and it is probable, therefore, that no arbitration of any kind will now be invoked ; since this ill-starred compact, in which all the concessions have been wrung from England, without any compensating equivalent, should of necessity stand or fall in its entirety. Still, I am desirous of stating the circumstances under which we long held the island of St. Juan in uncontested possession.

By a treaty concluded at Washington in 1846, it was provided that the Anglo-American north-western frontier line should run "along the 49th parallel of latitude, to the middle of the channel which separates the continent from the island of Vancouver, and thence southerly through the middle of the said channel and of Fuca Straits to the Pacific Ocean." This clear geographical definition would scarcely appear to admit of any dispute ; besides that, the only channel at that time used by shipping was a broad estuary between the Oregon coast and St. Juan, leaving that island far within our boundary. It had,

in fact, been always considered as belonging to England, and in 1846 was occupied by the Hudson's Bay Company, who leased it from the Crown as a dependency of Vancouver's. They had then a farm upon it, with some 2,000 sheep, besides cattle. Moreover, according to a correspondent of *The Times*, in a survey made by Colonel Fremont, under orders from the Washington Government, and after the treaty of 1846, this island was still shown on the British side. Nevertheless, in 1859, General Harney, conducting a filibustering expedition with United States' forces, seized upon a portion of St. Juan, and which, by a temporary convention, the Americans were suffered to retain in their possession; as, in like manner, we had been previously cajoled into abandoning Madawaska, the Mosquito shore, and our settlements on Columbia River. Former British statesmen promptly repelled attempted encroachments at Newfoundland, Nootka Sound, the Falkland Isles, and Honduras; but in those days no plausible appeals were made about "two great nations of the same lineage, at the head of civilization, haggling over some worthless islet, or strip of desert land"—the usual effect of such sentimental pleas being thoroughly appreciated by our astute cousins.

Some umbrage has been taken at my having characterized the public press of America as "unscrupulous and addicted to insolent bullying." I might, perhaps, have applied similar epithets to the Govern-

ment at Washington ; but as it is thought that I treated American rulers with exceptional severity, I may be permitted to quote higher authority for expressions equally forcible.

When there arose a question whether France and England should not only acknowledge the belligerent rights, but should recognize also the political independence of the Southern Confederacy, HISTORICUS, a distinguished writer to whom I have already adverted, engaged at considerable length in the controversy. He referred to former precedents adduced by those who advocated recognition, and, amongst others, to some measures taken by the American Government towards admitting the independence of Hungary, when in rebellion against Austria. After quoting a note from Wheaton, condemnatory of these manœuvres, the writer remarks that "the authority given to Mr. Mann was communicated by the President to the Senate, and ordered to be printed. The Austrian Government could hardly fail to take notice of a proceeding which was little less than an outrage, and took occasion to point out to the American Government that their agent, if he did not claim the character of a minister, ran the risk of being treated as a spy. The reply of Mr. Webster is couched in that language of overweening insolence towards an antagonist in difficulties which is eminently characteristic ; though when the American Secretary of State begs to inform the Austrian Government that

‘the propitious influence of free institutions is exemplified in the unparalleled prosperity of the United States,’ one cannot but feel that this sort of vulgar braggadocio might, in the present state of things, justify a smile even at Vienna.” This was written during the Southern Civil War, the conduct of the Washington Cabinet being described as “a feat of smartness which gave just offence to Austria, and merited the reprobation of Europe.”

Just for this present, Trans-Atlantic papers are said to have ceased their vituperation of England; for they are endeavouring to drive an exceedingly hard bargain, and “their words are softer than butter.” But it was far otherwise some few years since. Then, we were told that the “platform” or programme at one of their Presidential elections was “that they would have Cuba, and perhaps Jamaica along with it.” American writers at that time were loud in vaunting the power of their nation, “whose immense futurity, unrivalled by anything the world has ever seen, with territories stretching from ocean to ocean, and numbering a population of a hundred millions, should cause privilege to shiver and tremble with fear in all its fibres and arteries.” The Canadas and West Indies being—as they predicted—“added to their wide dominion, reaching from the frozen seas to Panama, American fleets and armies should dominate both oceans.” Vain illusions! Even at that moment their Union was upon the very brink of dissolution,

and the civil war waged soon after, has developed irreconcilable differences of character and feeling which can scarcely be composed.

Eminent Americans have often contemplated the advantages to be derived from a re-partition of their Federation into various distinct combinations of States; so that each separate portion might be at liberty to pursue whatever course should be best suited to its interests or its inclinations. In the event of any such disseverance, their historian Cooper conjectured that the manufacturing, maritime Republics of New England, and the Central Atlantic States, "would still keep together, and," as he thinks, "their marine would then be larger than if the Confederation should exist as it then stood; since in that case there could be but one opinion of its policy." There is indeed no true bond of nationality between the different commonwealths, several of whom have from time to time taken overt steps towards severing their tie with the Union. Thus, New England called a convention of its States at Hartford, to consider the expediency of concluding a separate treaty of peace with Great Britain, during our last war in 1813. With a barren soil, in an inclement clime, where there is hardly warmth enough to ripen a crop of maize this division, which alone can count on a race of hardy native seamen, is obviously calculated to become a considerable naval power. It has been clearly set apart from all the rest, both by usage, by the history

of its original foundation, and in the high moral principles for which it assumes to be still distinguished. The great "commercial States of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, would form an equally distinct Confederacy. So also would the Southern Plantation, or Gulf States; who one all revolted in 1861. The North-western commonwealths, being purely agricultural, require only a free commerce for their produce and imports through the St. Lawrence and Mississippi; untrammelled by vexatious dues imposed at the selfish instance of New England politicians. Remain the Pacific States, separated from their Eastern compatriots by thousands of miles through a vast unpeopled wilderness. What possible community of interest can there subsist between the two most remote extremes of all these sections,—between Massachusetts and California? Unless, indeed, it be for ambitious objects, and in order to constitute a great aggressive power. Such widely separated populations can be animated by no sentiment of affinity, or of brotherhood; for the interests of one State are neither understood nor cared for by the others. An enforced union of people so opposed in character and views, neither partaking of the same advantages, nor solicitous for common objects, and unconnected by any reasonable degree of propinquity, can never be a source of strength; and it resembles not so much a compact bundle of staves, but rather a bag of sand, in which the separate grains,

though held together for a time, retain always their original and distinct individuality, ever prone to fly asunder on the first concussion.

It may not be inappropriate here to quote the opinion of an American writer from a recently published pamphlet. Speaking of their late civil war, he says, "It should be borne in mind, that if England had broken the blockade, France would have joined her, and it would have been impossible for the North to have continued the war. England had but to stretch forth her hand, and the North and South would have been for ever separated, and England by that act, would have secured her dominions in, America—dominions which, amalgamated with the mother country, would have made her strong for ever. The temptation was very great; but it was resisted and overcome. Under the influence of a great and noble sentiment, she sacrificed her cotton manufactures and much of her commerce, and cast aside her jealousy of the great and to her dangerous power of the United States. Whether she acted in this with the prudence which usually governs nations in their foreign policy, remains to be proved." As "France alone makes war for an idea," so England, only, maintains peace at any price, from mere kindly feelings.

POSTSCRIPT.

APRIL 27TH, 1872.

I am desirous of citing some extracts from a pamphlet lately published at Washington, and attributed to an American Jurist of high repute. They may serve as an appendix to the foregoing letters. In no measured terms the able writer condemns his own Government for its palpable inconsistency, contrasting their conduct on the *Alabama* claims with a peremptory refusal of any compensation for Portuguese vessels captured by armed cruisers built, equipped, and sailing from American ports, under the unrecognised flag of a chief named Artigas, warring against Portugal in the Banda Oriental; although, as the Portuguese Minister forcibly represented, General Artigas did not anywhere possess a ship, a sailor, or a single sea port. These pretended privateers were manned by American seamen, some of them being commanded even by naval officers in the United States' service. Their prizes were brought into American ports, and there disposed of by public sale, customs duties being regularly paid upon their cargoes to the Federal revenue officers. "I can present you,"

affirms the Portuguese envoy, in his remonstrance to the American Secretary of State, "with a list of fifty Portuguese ships, almost all richly laden, some of them East-Indiamen, which have been taken by these people during a period of full peace. This is not the whole loss we have sustained, the list comprehending only those captures of which I have received official complaints. The victims have been many more, besides violations of territory, by landing and plundering ashore, with shocking circumstances. One city alone has armed twenty-six ships which prey upon our vitals ;" and many of the leading officials at Baltimore were accused of being either the owners, or otherwise interested in such adventures. A list of the captured vessels is given, and the loss is calculated at more than a million and a half of dollars. To all these reclamations the Cabinet at Washington returned only one invariable answer—"that the United States' Government were not responsible for any act of its citizens committed out of its jurisdiction and beyond their control." Moreover, "Mr. Webster declared that the American Government would not tolerate any further discussion of the claims in question ; and, consequently, Portugal, with the becoming humility of a small Power, dropped her claims." "Our *case*," says the American jurist, "professes to give the substance of this correspondence between our Government and that of Portugal upon the claims above referred to. It does not give the true substance, but only a

deceptive version of that correspondence, as will be clearly seen upon a comparison of the above abstract with that given in our 'case,' which is a bundle of equivocations, concealments, and misrepresentations." "Can it be asserted," asks the writer, "that the argument on this part of the case is fair, candid, and truthful? The intrepid audacity of its logic is unparalleled." "It shows our State department to be litigious and overbearing in the highest degree." This picture, be it remembered, is drawn by the skilled pencil of a native artist.

A congressional committee of foreign affairs asserted that their complaint against Great Britain was based upon her premature recognition of the rebels as belligerents; an acknowledgment, however, which their own Government admitted to have been inevitable. Still, the Committee declare that "the institutions and traditions of the American people compel sympathy for the humblest of the human family when struggling for liberty; and that it is impossible for them not to wish well to the cause of patriots everywhere." The Confederate States once separated *de facto*, are, as the writer observes, "now re-admitted into the Union, forming nearly one-half of the body called the United States, the complainants in the case before the Geneva Board of Arbitration; and if an amount of money were awarded to be paid by England to the United States, the very States whose cruisers made the captures complained of will

be the joint recipients of the compensation paid for those captures, and will have the joint control and disposition of the same. An indemnification for the captures made by Confederate cruizers could have been obtained from the conquered party, just as Germany has recently exacted an indemnification from France. The United States have extinguished this right by restoring the old Union of the States. That act renders the further prosecution of these claims inequitable, unseemly, and indecorous." "And now," adds the writer, "we are told, we ought to make war upon England, on the pretext that she aided the Confederacy. But before embarking in that war, it may be well to consider what might be the action of the ex-Confederate States and the Pacific States in certain contingencies." A New York journal, usually hostile to this country, confesses that "if England dare not go to war with us from the danger she would expose herself to from Ireland, still less dare we go to war with England, knowing how easily she could fan the discontent of the South into a new rebellion, which, with the aid of England, might defy all our power to subdue." As to any danger to be apprehended from Ireland, as this sagacious jurist remarks, "it appears to be purely imaginary." Finally, he concludes, "Our claims are clearly unjust. Why should we adhere to them? It is open to us now to declare that, even assuming them to have been rightful when first presented, they have become extinguished

by the restoration of the Union ; wherefore we ask that the treaty shall be abrogated." Such, also, seems to be the almost unanimous judgment of England ; for there are many who entirely mistrust American rulers, seeing how often they have succeeded in circumventing the English Government.

E. COCKREM, PRINTER, TORQUAY.

N O T E .

It has been reasonably conjectured that pending negotiations between Great Britain and America may be materially affected by the approaching quadrennial election of President ; a perpetually recurring agitation, which could at any time disturb our political relations with the United States. But I would venture to surmise that the question of Free Trade and of a protective Tariff, must also greatly influence any Presidential contest ; since, upon this subject, the interests of the Southern States with those of the powerful North-western Republics are clearly identified.

Years ago, the agricultural commonwealths comprised within the Missouri, the Ohio, and the Great Lakes, complained that their interests were sacrificed to the sordid policy of New England. It was declared that

these States would no longer consent to pay the taxation caused by what was termed a "New England war," that of the southern secession. Subsequently, however, many heavy taxes have been imposed by Congress, whilst an augmented Tariff has been enacted whose enhanced duties are levied for the gain of Eastern manufacturers, and to the detriment of the Western agriculturists ; although it is said that wherever the Federal army proved victorious in their civil warfare, most of the fighting business was done by troops from Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. New England (affirms a Chicago journal) furnished fewer soldiers, according to population, than any other district of the country ; and she was the only district which made money out of the war. So much did she make, that it was her interest that the war should continue. She made much more out of the war than she would have done, but for the Morill Tariff. She will pay less taxes, according to population and wealth for the war, than any other district of the country ; which, at the same time, has been heavily taxed, to enable New England to make money out of the war. This latter taxation comes of the Morill Tariff. Moreover the war, which was brought on mainly by New

England fanaticism, has destroyed the best market the West had for their products. "There is no disguising the fact," adds this journalist, "that the West is tiring of this sort of thing, and it will demand that the measure of taxation which Congress shall prepare, should be fairly adjusted with reference to the relative situation of New England, the Middle States, and the West. There is no negro in this conflict between New England and the West, but let New England see to it that the conflict does not become irrepressible." Now that all the Southern Plantation communities have been re-admitted into the Union, being equally concerned with the Western States in claiming the advantages of Free Trade, it seems probable that these two great Divisions will generally pull together.

Recent diplomatic discussions between the English Cabinet and American Rulers, so far from having had any conciliatory effect, would appear only to have still further prolonged their mutual misapprehensions; and it may well be doubted whether that undue deference so often shown by our Government towards the United States, out of regard for the "susceptibilities" of our captious cousins, may not, by encouraging their unreasonable exactions, tend rather to endanger peace

between the two countries. The exaggerated computation of even *direct* losses alleged to have been sustained through captures made by the *Alabama* and her consorts, as stated in the "American case," affords abundant evidence of that grasping disposition which actuates the Administration at Washington.

June 4th, 1872.

L. of C.



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